# DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS

## Links

### Title 22 Link---2NC

#### Asdf

Terrence K. Kelly et al 10, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation. From 2016 to 2022 he served as the first director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division. Terrence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, senior political scientist and former manager of the International and Security Policy Group at the RAND Corporation. Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for Department of Defense clients. Charlotte Lynch. "Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success" //pipk

### Cybersecurity---2NC

#### Cybersecurity is classified as ICB that is overseen by the DSCA

**ISG 22** [The Institute for Security Governance (The Institute for Security Governance — situated within the Defense Security Cooperation University’s (DSCU) International School of Education and Advising (ISEA) — is the Department of Defense’s Center of Excellence for Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). ISG is charged with building partner institutional capacity and capability through tailored advising, education, and professional development programs grounded in American values and approaches.), 1-2022, "BUILDING CAPABLE CYBERSECURITY INSTITUTIONS," <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check_logged_in=1>] // st

Building the capacity of defense cyber institutions can help partner nations identify, assess, and better understand risks, capacities, and threats within their defense cyber ecosystem. The cyberspace institutional capacity building community can act as a convener and integrator, bringing together partner nation civilian and military officials to: ¶ Identify critical partner nation cybersecurity needs and agree on areas of mutual interest for engagement with the U.S.¶ Devise risk mitigation strategies and codify applicable policies and procedures¶ Build new capabilities or institutions that are resourced, trained, and equipped to effectively manage cybersecurity systems¶ Align interoperability requirements between U.S. security cooperation assistance and partner nation systems¶ Enhance the integrity and security of local cyber defense institutions¶ Develop human capital strategies for building and sustaining a cyber workforce¶ CCB supports the development of cyberspace governance, national frameworks, policy, strategy, and workforce development planning, which can become a force multiplier for many other programs. Building new cyber capabilities together with a partner nation is not enough. These must be effectively integrated into their force structure, sustained and maintained, and well-coordinated with other capabilities. Therefore, ISG enables close partnership with diverse implementers, within DoD’s security cooperation ecosystem as well as across industry and academia. Working together with the cybersecurity capacity building community, ISG is developing shared tools and approaches to enhance the outcome of its work alongside partner nations. In addition, the Institute is working to integrate cybersecurity into the mainstream of ICB planning, and to support the integration of country-level projects among the various implementers. The Institute’s CCB activities encompasses several initiatives:¶ Support the integration of partner nation cyberrelated requirements into ICB planning and design and support the integration of capacity building projects at the country-level ¶ Support the development of a common assessment methodology and lend support to GCCs to conduct assessments of partner nation cyber capabilities as needed¶ Deliver a range of capacity building and educational engagements on cyber governance, policy, and strategy in support of GCCs and partners¶ Create tools and aides for the broader community of interest/practice. Most recently, the Institute conducted a study, initiated by ODASD Cyber Policy, and developed 1) a cyber-focused capacity building playbook; and, 2) a workforce development framework and compendium of relevant U.S. training/education in support of the broad cyber capacity building community. These products, developed through a collaborative process, aim to further harmonize and improve the cyber community’s development of partners’ cybersecurity capabilities.¶ WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING? Institutional Capacity Building programs, overseen by DSCA, encompass Security Cooperation activities that directly support U.S. ally and partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies necessary to effectively and responsibly achieve shared security objectives.¶ ILLUSTRATIVE PARTNER INSTITUTIONS FOR ICB¶ Partner nations’ civilian and military organizations focused at the strategic and operational levels such as Ministries of Defense and Interior, intelligence services, law enforcement organizations, military services, and legislatures.¶ ILLUSTRATIVE ICB DOMAINS¶ Strategy & Policy¶ Resource Management¶ Human Resource Management¶ Acquisition & Logistics¶ Force Management¶ Law & Human Rights

## Uniqueness

### Int’l SC High---2NC

#### The Global Posture Review has been released and solves democracy impact

Jim Garamone 21, reporter, U.S. Department of Defense, “Biden Approves Global Posture Review Recommendations, 11-29-2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2856053/biden-approves-global-posture-review> recommendations/#:~:text=The%20Global%20Posture%20Review%20has,with%20his%20national%20security%20guidance, bk

"That guidance asserts that the United States will lead with diplomacy first, revitalize our unmatched network of allies and partners and make smart and disciplined choices regarding our national defense and responsible use of our military," Karlin said. "Nested within this guidance, the global posture review assesses DOD overseas forces and footprint along with the framework and processes that govern our posture decision making."

The main outcome of the review is the return to normal of determining military posture around the world and tying that to America's strategic alignment, an official speaking on background earlier in the day said. "The GPR has strengthened our decision making processes by deliberately connecting strategic priorities, global trade-offs, force readiness and modernization, interagency coordination and allied and partner coordination to global posture planning and decisions," the official said.

It is no surprise that the Indo-Pacific is the priority region for the review, given the secretary's focus on China as America's pacing challenge. The review directs additional cooperation with allies and partners to advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability and deter Chinese military aggression and threats from North Korea, Karlin said.

These initiatives include seeking greater regional access for military partnership activities, enhancing infrastructure in Guam and Australia and prioritizing military construction across the Pacific Islands. They also include new U.S. rotational aircraft deployments and logistics cooperation in Australia, which DOD announced in September.

The review also approved the stationing of a previously rotational attack helicopter squadron and an artillery division headquarters in the Republic of Korea.

More initiatives are forthcoming in the region, but these require more discussions among the allies and remain classified, Karlin said.

In Europe, the review looks to strengthen the U.S. combat deterrent against Russia, and enable NATO forces to operate more effectively, she said. DOD has already instituted a couple of recommendations including lifting the 25,000-man cap on active duty troops in Germany imposed by the previous administration and the decision to permanently base a multi-domain task force and theater fires command — a total of 500 U.S. Army personnel — in Wiesbaden, Germany. DOD will also retain seven sites previously designated for return to Germany and Belgium under the European infrastructure consolidation plan. The review identified additional capabilities that will enhance U.S. deterrence posture in Europe, and these will be discussed with allies in the near future, Karlin said.

### DSCA Key---2NC

#### DSCA is effectively getting weapons to Ukraine now but tempo is key

David Vergun 22, reporter for DOD news, US Department of Defense, “DOD Official Describes How Security Assistance Gets to Ukraine”, 4-19-2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3003989/dod-official-describes-how-security-assistance-gets-to-ukraine/>, bk

Since the beginning of the invasion, DSCA has executed $2.3 billion in presidential drawdown of security assistance to Ukraine and $300 million under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative as of April 1, the official said.

The term presidential drawdown is used when the president authorizes military hardware to be pulled from existing U.S. military stock.

"This is a time of higher [operations tempo] and faster movement than we've really ever done in our history," the official said.

The official then described how a presidential drawdown works.

Working together with the Ukrainians and with U.S. European Command, a list of requirements is developed and shared with those who work on policy in the Pentagon. Coordination of stocks and deliveries is also made with allies and partners.

A determination is made whether the U.S. industrial base can refill those stocks over time.

DSCA shares the list with the military departments, to determine if they have the availability of the stocks.

The military departments provide information on what the readiness impacts are of drawing down that equipment from U.S. stocks.

The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff provides his recommendations and then a memorandum goes to the secretary of defense for his approval of the drawdown plan.

The package of requirements is then built.

At that point, the president will direct the drawdown.

Then, the State Department secretary signs a memo directing DOD to execute and then DSCA puts out the executive order.

Although there seem to be a lot of steps, that whole process has been known in the last several months to done in as few as 48 to 72 hours, which is unprecedented, the official said.

### Ukraine Aid High---2NC

#### Biden just sent another $400 Million to Ukraine. Demand for equipment puts more pressure on the DOD.

Lolita **Baldor 7/8**/22, National Security reporter for the Associated Press, Washington Post, “US sending $400 million more in military aid to Ukraine”,https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-sending-400-million-in-military-aid-to-ukraine/2022/07/08/c0acc308-fee3-11ec-b39d-71309168014b\_story.html, bk

WASHINGTON — The Biden administration said Friday that it will send another $400 million in military equipment to Ukraine, including four more advanced rocket systems. The weapons, said a senior defense official, will bolster Ukrainian efforts to strike deeper behind Russian frontlines in the eastern Donbas region.

The aid comes as Moscow this week claimed full control of Ukraine's Luhansk province in the Donbas, but Ukrainian officials say their troops still control a small part of the province and fierce fighting continues in several villages.

The defense official said that the eight High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, that were previously sent are still being used by Ukraine forces in the fight. This will give them four more to help hit Russian command and control nodes, logistics capabilities and other systems that are further back behind the battlefront. A senior military official said at least 100 Ukrainian troops have been trained on the HIMARs. Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details not yet made public.

Russia in recent days has launched dozens of missiles across Ukraine and pinned down Ukrainian forces with continuous long-range fire for sometimes hours at a time. The U.S. military official said that 10 to 15 Russian battalion tactical groups are in the Donbas region, but that Russia has sustained significant losses in the recent fighting and may have to pause to reorganize and reset equipment. There are between 800 to 1,000 troops in a battalion tactical group.

Ukraine’s leaders have publicly called on Western allies to quickly send more ammunition and advanced systems that will help them narrow the gap in equipment and manpower. The precision weapons can help Ukraine hit Russian weapons that are farther away and are being used to bombard Ukrainian locations.

The latest aid, approved by President Joe Biden on Friday afternoon, is the 15th package of military weapons and equipment transferred to Ukraine from Defense Department stocks since last August. In addition to the HIMARS, the U.S. will also send 1,000 rounds of 155 millimeter artillery which has an increased precision capability that also will help Ukraine hit specific targets. The package also will include three tactical vehicles, counter battery radar systems, spare parts and other equipment.

Acting Pentagon Press Secretary Todd Breasseale said the assistance will meet critical needs for Ukraine’s fight.

Looking ahead to the coming months, the defense official said that a key goal is to build up Ukraine’s logistics and repair capabilities so troops can maintain its weapons systems and continue the fight into the future.

Overall, the U.S. has sent about $7.3 billion in aid to Ukraine since the war began in late February.

#### Multinational coordination is ongoing and key to Ukraine. US is the key facilitator

Vivienne **Machi 22**, reporter for Defense News, Defense News, “US, allies to meet monthly on Ukraine defense needs”, 5-2-2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/26/us-allies-to-meet-monthly-on-ukraine-defense-needs/>, bk

RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany — Defense leaders from more than 40 nations amassed on a blustery April day in southwestern Germany, recruited by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to better coordinate efforts supporting Ukraine in its defense against the Russian invasion.

Tuesday’s gathering, which was organized with less than a week’s notice, will now be a monthly event. Austin announced the creation of a standing Ukraine-focused “contact group” during a press briefing at the end of the event at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

“The contact group will be a vehicle for nations of goodwill to intensify our efforts, coordinate our assistance, and focus on winning today’s fight and the struggles to come,” Austin said.

A key focus of these meetings will be improved coordination with participating nations’ defense-industrial bases, he added. “That means dealing with the tremendous demand that we’re facing for munitions and weapons platforms.”

The congregation of so many countries — not only NATO members but also partners based in Africa, Asia and the Middle East — on Tuesday sends “a powerful signal,” Austin added. Several nations, including Germany and Canada, announced new heavy weapons shipments to Ukraine over the course of the event.

While this meeting was in person, future gatherings could be virtual or mixed, he noted. A senior defense official told reporters there will likely be more nations attending virtually.

The intent is to include any nation that wants to contribute to the self-defense of Ukraine, and the monthly meetings will take place in different locations, the official added, noting that the frequency of the meetings is due to the sense of urgency participants feel about the second phase of the war in Ukraine, as Russia focuses its attention and combat power in the Donbas region.

The meeting Tuesday and its successive events to follow are just one example of the U.S. Defense Department and its allies’ plans to continue supplying lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine as quickly as possible.

In March, U.S. European Command created a new unit called EUCOM Control Center Ukraine, or ECCU, to coordinate and synchronize equipment deliveries from Washington and its partners. Fifteen other partner nations — including NATO and non-NATO countries — have provided staff stationed at the center, located at U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart, a senior defense official told reporters Tuesday.

ECCU, led by the command’s director of logistics, Rear Adm. R. Duke Heinz, consists of a “near-soup-to-nuts of all things security systems delivery,” and combines a call center, a watch floor and meeting rooms, the official said. It has facilitated the delivery of equipment from more than 40 nations to Ukraine.

The center has worked to ensure those deliveries are facilitated as quickly as possible, the official added, noting that since Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, the DoD has significantly ramped up delivery rates — from one flight every other day, to about eight to 10 flights per day.

“At some points, it has spiked to nearly double that as we ramped up our coordination and logistics efforts to make sure that we’re meeting the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces in near-real time,” the official added. The U.S. military has also expanded its equipment delivery support from “a single path” to a “multi-modal effort,” including multiple routes over air, ground and rail, the official said.

In the 60-plus days since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, nations have supplied more than $5 billion worth of equipment to the Ukrainian forces, with about $3.7 billion coming from the United States, Austin said Tuesday.

## Impacts

### DIB Impact

#### Defense base innovation is key check great power competition from Russia and China.

**Marks 19**, Michael, former Senior Policy Advisor to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of State., 10-10-2019, "Strengthen Us Industry To Counter National Security Challenges," American Military News, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/10/strengthen-us-industry-to-counter-national-security-challenges/

While U.S. defense budgets have recently been on the rise, it is likely that we will see a spending decline in the coming years as competition for non-defense federal budget dollars increases and deficits grow. The United States, therefore, must take action to ensure that we maintain our technological edge against our adversaries by empowering the private sector to provide cost-effective innovation for America’s defense. Since the end of the Second World War the U.S. has relied on qualitative superiority over its potential adversaries, especially those like the Soviet Union/Russia and China, who enjoyed comparative quantitative advantages. These qualitative advantages were vital to maintaining global stability and helped enable our nation to become the preeminent global economy, but they have been eroded over the last few decades. In 1960, the U.S. share of global research and development (R&D) spending stood at 69%. U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounted for 36% of total global expenditures. Soon thereafter other nations recognized the need to increase their R&D expenditures and build their own defense industrial bases to compete with the United States. From 2000-2016, China’s share of global R&D rose from 4.9% to 25.1% while the U.S. share of global R&D dropped to 28%. U.S. defense-related R&D meanwhile now makes up a mere 4% of global R&D spending. There can be no doubt that Russia and China are determined to challenge America’s qualitative advantage. From the rebirth of Russian military power under Vladimir Putin to the ever-growing Chinese military prowess across the board, their efforts show no sign of slowing down. Russia has been and continues to undergo a major modernization of its armed forces. For example, they are in the midst of a ten-year program to build hundreds of new nuclear missiles and have set a goal of modernizing 70% of the Russian Ground Force’s equipment by 2020. One of the most frightening examples of Russia’s resurgence is its development of a hypersonic missile that could be ready for combat as early as 2020. Worryingly, the US is currently unable to defend against this type of missile. To accompany these developments came the emergence in 2017 of Russia as the world’s second-largest arms producer, ready and able to support nations hostile to US interests. China, on the other hand, used to be a country that only manufactured cheap products and knockoffs, but that is no longer true. Technology development and innovation figure prominently in all of China’s national planning goals, with plans to make the country the global leader in science and innovation and the preeminent technological and manufacturing power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese communist revolution. This, of course, has huge implications for China’s military capability. The country now has the second-largest national defense budget behind the U.S. and wants to be Asia’s preeminent military power. Beijing is developing next-generation fighter jets, ICBMs and shorter-range ballistic missiles, as well as advanced naval vessels. The People’s Liberation Army has reached a critical point of confidence and now feel they can match competitors like the United States in combat. This has implications for the security of Taiwan, Japan, other US allies in the region as well as to America itself. To make matters worse, there are a growing number of experts that see China developing asymmetric technologies, combined with conventional and nuclear systems that could create an existential threat to the U.S. pacific based assets. It is in the wake of these growing threats to our national security American industry will likely be expected to shoulder an even larger responsibility concerning investment in defense-related R&D. One of the ways we can empower companies to make these additional investments and lead next-generation defense innovation is to allow commonsense mergers between important defense and aerospace companies. Horizontal consolidation eliminates the redundancy of enormous fixed costs, leading to savings passed down to customers. Mergers can also create economies of scale and existing synergies that help the combined company realize access to larger numbers of engineers and innovators, while keeping costs low and improving the timeline for taking a product from concept to development. A recent example of how this can work is the proposed Raytheon and United Technologies merger. The two parties project that the new combined company will employ more than 60,000 engineers, hold over 38,000 patents and invest approximately $8 billion per year in research and development. This will allow the development of new, critical technologies more quickly and efficiently than either company could on its own. Such private sector investments in innovation will be critical in the face of the growing challenges to American military dominance. America’s R&D advantage, crucial to maintaining military superiority, is increasingly at risk. As China and Russia continue to challenge America’s military dominance and pressures on the defense budget continue to mount, the federal government will likely turn more and more to contractors and commercial companies to develop next-generation defense capabilities. Strengthening U.S. industry, therefore, will be critical to countering our national security challenges.

#### That risks nuclear escalation

**Mitchell 16,** A. Wess Mitchell 2016, President of the Center for European Policy Analysis, 2-12-2016, Predators on the Frontier” The American Interest, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/12/predators-on-the-frontier/>

Revisionist powers are on the move. ‎From eastern Ukraine and the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, large rivals of the United States are modernizing their military forces, grabbing strategic real estate, and threatening vulnerable U.S. allies. Their goal is not just to assert hegemony over their neighborhoods but to rearrange the global security order as we have known it since the end of the Second World War. We first wrote about these emerging dynamics in 2010, and then in TAI in 2011. We argued three things. First, that revisionist powers were using a strategy of “probing”: a combination of assertive diplomacy and small but bold military actions to test the outer reaches of American power and in particular the resilience of frontier allies. Second, we argued that the small, exposed allies who were the targets of these probes were likely to respond by developing back-up options to U.S. security guarantees, whether through military self-help or accommodation. And third, we argued that that China and Russia were learning from one another’s probes in their respective regions, and that allies themselves were drawing conclusions about U.S. deterrence in their own neighborhood from how America handled similarly situated allies elsewhere. Five years later, as we argue in a new book released this month, these dynamics have intensified dramatically. Revisionist powers are indeed probing the United States, but their methods have become bolder, more violent—and successful. Allies have grown more alert to this pressure, amid the steady whittling away of neighboring buffer zones, and have begun to pursue an array of self-help schemes ranging from arms build-ups to flirtations with the nearby revisionist power. It has become harder for the United States to isolate security crises to one region: Russia’s land-grabs in Eastern Europe provide both a model and distraction effect for China to accelerate its maritime claims in the South China Sea; Poland’s quest for U.S. strategic reassurance unnerves and spurs allies in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific. By degrees, the world is entering the path to war. Not since the 1980s have the conditions been riper for a major international military crisis. Not since the 1930s has the world witnessed the emergence of multiple large, predatory states determined to revise the global order to their advantage—if necessary by force. At a minimum, the United States in coming years could face the pressure of managing several deteriorating regional security spirals; at a maximum, it could be confronted with a Great Power war against one, and possibly two or even three, nuclear-armed peer competitors. In either case, the U.S. military could face these scenarios without either the presumption of technological overmatch or favorable force ratios that it has enjoyed against its rivals for the past several decades. How should the United States respond to these dynamics? As our rivals grow more aggressive and our military edge narrows, we must look to other methods for waging and winning geopolitical competitions in the 21st century. The most readily available but underutilized tool at our disposal is alliances. America’s frontline allies offer a mechanism by which it can contain rivals—indeed, this was the original purpose for cultivating security linkages with small states in the world’s rimland regions to begin with. In coming years, the value of strategically placed allies near Eurasia’s large land powers will grow as our relative technological or numerical military strength shrinks. The time has come for the United States to develop a grand strategy for containing peer competitors centered on the creative use of frontline allies. It must do so now, before geopolitical competition intensifies. Predatory Peers Probing has been the strategy of choice for America’s modern rivals to challenge the existing order. Over the past few years, Russia, China, and, to a degree, Iran have sensed that the United States is retreating in their respective regions—whether out of choice, fatigue, weakness, or all three combined. But they are unsure of how much remaining strength the United States has, or of the solidity of its commitments to allies. Rather than risking direct war, they have employed low-intensity crises to test U.S. power in these regions. Like past revisionists, they have focused their probes on seemingly secondary interests of the leading power, either by humbling its weakest allies or seizing gray zones over which the United States is unlikely to fight. These probes test the United States on the outer rim of its influence, where the revisionist’s own interests are strongest while the U.S. is at its furthest commitments and therefore most vulnerable to defeat. Russia has launched a steady sequence of threatening military moves against vulnerable NATO allies and conducted limited offensives against former Soviet satellite states. China has sought out low-intensity diplomatic confrontations with small U.S. security clients, erected military no-go zones, and asserted claims over strategic waterways. When we wrote about this behavior in The American Interest in 2011, it was composed mainly of aggressive diplomacy or threatening but small military moves. But the probes of U.S. rivals are becoming bolder. Sensing a window of opportunity, in 2014 Russia upped the ante by invading Ukraine—the largest country in Eastern Europe—in a war that has so far cost 7,000 lives and brought 52,000 square kilometers of territory into the Russian sphere of influence. After years of using unmarked fishing trawlers to harass U.S. or allied naval vessels, China has begun to militarize its probes in the South China Sea, constructing seven artificial islands and claiming (and threatening to fight over) 1.8 million square kilometers of ocean. Iran has recently humiliated the United States by holding American naval vessels and broadcasting photos of surrendering U.S. sailors. In all cases, revisionist powers increased the stakes because they perceived their initial probes to have succeeded. Having achieved modest gains, they increased the intensity of their probes. The strategic significance of these latest probes for the United States is twofold. First, they have substantially increased the military pressure on frontline allies. The presence of a buffer zone of some sort, whether land or sea, between allies like Poland or Japan and neighboring revisionist powers, helped to reduce the odds of sustained contact and confrontation between allied and rival militaries. By successfully encroaching on or invading these middle spaces, revisionists have advanced the zone of contest closer to the territory of U.S. allies, increasing the potential for a deliberate or accidental military clash. Second, the latest probes have significantly raised the overall pressure on the United States. As long as Russia’s military adventures were restricted to its own southern periphery, America could afford to shift resources to the Pacific without worrying much about the consequences in Europe—an important consideration given the Pentagon’s jettisoning of the goal to be able to fight a two-front war. With both Ukraine and the South China Sea at play (and with a chaotic Middle East, where another rival, Iran, advances its reach and influence), the United States no longer has the luxury of prioritizing one region over another; with two re-militarized frontiers at opposite ends of the globe, it must continually weigh trade-offs in scarce military resources between geographic theaters. This disadvantage is not lost on America’s rivals, or its most exposed friends. Frontier Frenzy The intensification of probing has reverberated through the ranks of America’s frontline allies. In both Europe and Asia, the edges of the Western order are inhabited by historically vulnerable small or mid-sized states that over the past seven decades have relied on the United States for their existence. The similarities in the geopolitical position and strategic options of states like Estonia and Taiwan, or Poland and South Korea, are striking. For all of these states, survival depends above all on the sustainability of U.S. extended deterrence, in both its nuclear and conventional forms. This in turn rests on two foundations: the assumption among rivals and allies alike that the United States is physically able to fulfill its security obligations to even the smallest ally, and the assumption that it is politically willing to do so. Doubts about both have been growing for many years. Reductions in American defense spending are weakening the U.S. military capability to protect allies. Due to cuts introduced by the 2009 Budget Control Act, the U.S. Navy is smaller than at any point since before the First World War, the U.S. Army is smaller than at any point since before the Second World War and the U.S. Air Force has the lowest number of operational warplanes in its history. Nuclear force levels are static or declining, and the U.S. technological edge over rivals in important weapons types has diminished. The Pentagon in 2009 announced that for the first time since the Second World War it would jettison the goal of being able to conduct a two-front global war. At the same time that U.S. capabilities are decreasing, those of our rivals are increasing. Both Russia and China have undertaken large, multiyear military expansion and modernization programs and the technological gap between them and the United States is narrowing, particularly in key areas such as short-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Recent American statecraft has compounded the problem by weakening the belief in U.S. political will to defend allies. The early Obama Administration’s public questioning of the value of traditional alliances as “alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War” shook allied confidence at the same time that its high-profile engagement with large rivals indicated a preference for big-power bargaining over the heads of small states. The U.S.-Russia “reset” seemed to many allies both transactional and freewheeling, and left a lasting impression of the suddenness with which U.S. priorities could shift from one Administration to the next. This undermined the predictability of patronage that is the sine qua non of effective deterrence for any Great Power. As the revisionists’ probes have become more assertive and U.S. credibility less firm, America’s frontier allies have started to reconsider their national security options. Five years ago, many frontline states expressed security concerns, began to seek greater military capabilities, or looked to offset risk by engaging diplomatically with revisionists. But for the most part, such behavior was muted and well within the bounds of existing alliance commitments. However, as probing has picked up pace, allied coping behavior has become more frantic. In Europe, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania have initiated military spending increases. In Asia, littoral U.S. allies are engaged in a worrisome regional arms race. In both regions, the largest allies are considering offensive capabilities to create conventional deterrence. Their willingness to build up their indigenous military capabilities is overall a positive development, but it carries risks, too, spurring dynamics that were absent over the past decades. The danger is that, absent a consistent and credible U.S. overwatch, rearming allies engage in a chaotic acquisition strategy, poorly anchored in the larger alliance. Fearing abandonment, such states may end up detaching themselves from the alliance simply by pursuing independent security policies. There is also danger on the other side of the spectrum of possible responses by frontline allies. Contrary to the hopeful assumptions of offshore balancers, not all frontline allies are resisting. Some are choosing strategies of accommodation. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia in Europe and Thailand and Malaysia in Asia are all examples of nominal U.S. allies that are trying to avoid antagonizing the stronger predator. Worsening regional security dynamics create domestic political pressures to avoid confrontation with the nearby revisionist power. Full-fledged bandwagoning in the form of the establishment of new alliances is not yet visible, but hedging is. Seeds of Disorder The combination of intensifying probes and fragmenting alliances threatens to unravel important components of the stability of major regions and the wider international order. Allowed to continue on their current path, security dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific could lead to negative or even catastrophic outcomes for U.S. national security. One increasingly likely near-term scenario is a simmering, simultaneous security competition in major regions. In such a scenario, rivals continue probing allies and grabbing middle-zone territory while steering clear of war with the United States or its proxies; allies continue making half-measure preparations without becoming fully capable of managing their own security; and the United States continues feeding greater and greater resources into frontline regions without achieving reassurance, doggedly tested and put in doubt by the revisionists. Through a continued series of probes, the revisionist powers maintain the initiative while the United States and its allies play catch up. The result might be a gradual hardening of the U.S. security perimeter that never culminates in a Great Power war but generates many of the negative features of sustained security competition—arms races, proxy wars, and cyber and hybrid conflicts—that erode the bases of global economic growth. A second, graver possibility is war. Historically, a lengthy series of successful probes has often culminated in a military confrontation. One dangerous characteristic of today’s international landscape is that not one but two revisionists have now completed protracted sequences of probes that, from their perspective, have been successful. If the purpose of probing is to assess the top power’s strength, today’s probes could eventually convince either Russia, China, or both that the time is ripe for a more definitive contest. It is uncertain what the outcome would be. Force ratios in today’s two hotspots, the Baltic Sea and South China Sea, do not favor the United States. Both Russia and China possess significant anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities, with a ten-to-one Russian troop advantage in the Baltic and massive Chinese preponderance of coastal short-range missiles in the South China Sea. Moreover, both powers possess nuclear weapons and, in Russia’s case, a doctrine favoring their escalatory use for strategic effect. And even if the United States can maintain overwhelming military superiority in a dyadic contest, war is always the realm of chance and a source of destruction that threatens the stability of the existing international order. Having failed a series of probes, the United States could face the prospect of either a short, sharp war that culminates in nuclear attack or an economically costly protracted two-front conflict. Either outcome would definitely alter the U.S.-led international system as we know it. A third, long-term possibility is a gradual eviction of the United States from the rimland regions. This could occur either through a military defeat, as described above, or through the gradual hollowing out of U.S. regional alliances due to the erosion of deterrence and alliance defection—and therefore this scenario is not mutually exclusive of the previous two. For the United States, this would be geopolitically disastrous, involving a loss of position in the places where America must be present to prevent the risk of hemispheric isolation. Gaining a foothold in the Eurasian rimlands has been a major, if not the most important, goal of U.S. grand strategy for a century. It is through this presence that the United States is able to shape global politics and avoid the emergence of mortal threats to itself. Without such a presence, America’s largest rivals would be able to steadily aggrandize, building up enlarged spheres of influence, territory, and resources that would render them capable of sustained competition for global primacy. Unlike in the 20th century, current A2AD and nuclear technology would make a military reentry into these regions difficult if not impossible.

### Laundry List

#### Permanently destabilizes the West – laundry list of catastrophic impacts

**Fix and Kimmage 22** [Liana Fix (Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C.) and Michael Kimmage (Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.), 2-18-2022, "What If Russia Wins?," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check_logged_in=1>] // st

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.¶ MANY WAYS TO WIN¶ For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in Syria, victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.¶ If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.¶ The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.¶ Eastern member states would have NATO troops permanently on their soil.¶ Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.¶ Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.¶ IMPERILING EUROPE'S EAST¶ In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.¶ Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members. ¶ Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.¶ The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.¶ Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.¶ Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.¶ TURNING NATO INWARD¶ For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world.¶ NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma.¶ The nuclear superpowers would have to keep their outrage in check.¶ For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, but it may initiate new conversations.

### Food Prices

#### Spikes food prices

**Tisdall 22** [Simon Tisdall (A foreign affairs commentator. He has been a foreign leader writer, foreign editor and US editor for the Guardian), 4-1-2022, "The awful truth is dawning: Putin may win in Ukraine. The result would be catastrophe," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/the-awful-truth-is-dawning-putin-may-win-in-ukraine-the-result-would-be-catastrophe>] // st

The price of failure – the true cost of a Putin victory – could be staggering. It is potentially unsupportable for fractious western democracies and poorer countries alike, beset by simultaneous post-pandemic security, energy, food, inflation and climate crises. Yet out of myopic self-interest over issues such as Russian oil and gas imports, and from fear of wider escalation, western leaders duck the tough choices that could ensure Ukraine’s survival and help mitigate such ills.¶ The past week furnished a grim glimpse of the future that awaits if Putin is able to continue to wage war with impunity, commit more heinous crimes, threaten nuclear and chemical blackmail and trash the UN charter. Drastically downgrading its growth forecasts due to the conflict, the International Monetary Fund predicted global economic fragmentation, rising debt and social unrest.¶ David Malpass, head of the World Bank, said a “human catastrophe” loomed as an unprecedented, estimated 37% rise in food prices, caused by war-related disruption to supplies, pushed millions into poverty, increased malnutrition, and reduced funding for education and healthcare for the least well-off.

#### Rising food prices is a major driver of conflict

**UN News 5/19** [UN News (UN News is a part of the UN Department of Global Communications that tells the United Nations story across multiple platforms, digital and traditional, to build support for the aims and work of the Organization.), 5-19-2022, "Food insecurity threatens societies, exacerbates conflicts and ‘no country is immune’," UN News, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118652>] // st

He cited destabilizing dynamics in Mali, Chad, Malawi, and Burkina Faso; riots and protests in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan and Peru; conflicts in Ethiopia and Afghanistan; drought and famine in Africa, and a “ring of fire around the world” as an escalating number of people continue “marching to starvation”.¶ “Food security is critical to peace and stability” globally, he underscored.¶ The WFP chief said 276 million people are struggling to find food, and 49 million in 43 countries are “knocking on famine’s door,” which results not only in death but “unmatched migration,” which destabilizes societies.¶ And while the “perfect storm” has resulted in a rise in food prices in 2022, he said that food availability would be the big concern in 2023.¶ Mr. Beasley stressed the importance of increasing production, opening Ukraine’s ports and emptying its silos to stabilize markets and address the global food crisis.¶ “Act with urgency today,” he told the Council.¶ Reversing prosperity¶ The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Director-General, Qu Dongyu, discussed the importance of people, peace, prosperity and the planet.¶ “Worldwide, prosperity is being reversed,” he said. “There is less food security, health security and income” while inequality becomes greater.¶ He pointed to a “spike in acute hunger globally,” with 2022 threatening even further deterioration.¶ While FAO has strengthened agri-food systems to save lives and protect livelihoods for the most vulnerable, “more needs to be done together,” according to its top official, who called conflict “the single greatest driver of hunger”.

#### Older card: High food prices cause global conflict.

**Castellaw 17**, 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC. (John, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)

The United States faces many **threats** to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as **ISIS** and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power **Iran.** The heated economic and diplomatic competition with **Russia** and a surging **China** could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An **American Food Security Strategy** is an imperative factor in **reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing.** Recent history has shown that **reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries.** Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. **Food insecurity** drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, **generating conflicts**, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. **Food system shocks** from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from **American farmers** and ranchers. **Emerging markets** currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is **expected to grow** as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often **these situations deteriorate into shooting wars** requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

### Reclaiming Territory

#### Russia will assert itself as “Great Russia” – further emboldens Russia to attack other great powers which escalates into hybrid war

**Midttun 20** [Hans Petter Midttun (Hans Petter Midttun is educated at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the Norwegian National Defence Command and Staff College and the Norwegian Defense College, as well as education from the Federal Defence Forces of Germany. He has broad international experience from both operations and postings abroad (NATO, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Ukraine). The service includes seven years in command of frigates and six NATO deployments. Midttun put into operation, tested and verified the operational capabilities of one of the newest frigates in the Norwegian Navy. He served at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) before being posted to Ukraine as the Norwegian Defence Attache (2014-2018). Based on previous experiences, Midttun is presently publishing articles and analytic works on the security situation in and around Ukraine as a private person.), 5-22-2020, "What if? Hybrid War and consequences for Europe (part 1)," Euromaidan Press, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/06/what-if-hybrid-war-and-consequences-for-europe-part-1/>] // st

Russia is already confident enough to start wars to change borders in Europe, attempt a coup in Montenegro; conduct multiple cyber-attacks against Western nations; meddle in several referendums and elections; assassinating (or attempt thereof) of Russian individuals abroad, and conduct influence operations across Europe.¶ A Russian defeat of Ukraine will mark the rise of “Great Russia” in both physical and psychological terms.¶ Firstly, it would happen because the West allowed Russia to defeat Ukraine. The tools we selected to coerce Russia into cooperation – being the same the West always applies – would once again have been proven impotent. Neither sanctions, (temporarily) diplomatic isolation, dialogue, international condemnation nor military measures would have stopped Russia.¶ Russia recognizes that if it is commercially attractive today, it will become even more so as “Great Russia” (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) with a population of nearly 200 million people. President Putin has even argued that¶ “… any integration of Russia and Ukraine, along with their capacities and competitive advantages would spell the emergence of a rival, a global rival for both Europe and the world. No one wants this. That’s why they’ll do anything to tear us apart.”¶ A Russia “reconnected” to its past economic marked, with a revamped defense industry, controlling a bigger part of Europe’s supply of both energy and agricultural product, an emerging IT industry, while simultaneously dominating both present and emerging shipping lane between Europe and Asia (Eastern Mediterranean and North-East Passage), will emerge more self-confident than ever.¶ It will emerge as the global power it always aspired to be, partner to the US and China only. Being a nuclear power already, Russia will also have a modernized, battle-hardened and reinforced conventional force, capable of operating effectively under the Hybrid War concept.¶ Russia will emerge stronger at the cost of the West. We will have emboldened and enlarged an aggressive nation with great power ambitions. Russian self-confidence will be a consequence of both strategic wins and a restored and tested military power, as well as a perception of a West in decline.

#### Additional ev: The threat is real and should be the top priority

**Vakhitov and Zaika 4/27** [Volodymyr Vakhitov (An assistant professor at the Kyiv School of Economics and head of BeSmart, the Center for Behavioral Studies and Communications) and Natalia Zaika (A researcher at BeSmart, the Center for Behavioral Studies and Communications.), 4-27-2022, "Beyond Putin: Russian imperialism is the No. 1 threat to global security," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/beyond-putin-russian-imperialism-is-the-no-1-threat-to-global-security/>] // st

If Russian imperialism is not confronted and defeated in Ukraine, other countries will soon face similar threats. While Ukraine appears to be a particular obsession for both Putin and the wider Russian public, the list of other potential victims is long. The Baltic states and Moldova are among the most likely to become targets of Russian imperial aggression, while the nations of Central Asia are clearly at risk. It is also worth noting that Poland and Finland were once part of the Russian Empire that Putin longs to resurrect. ¶ For almost three decades, Western leaders have approached successive acts of Russian imperial aggression as isolated incidents and have sought to downplay their significance while focusing on the economic advantages of continuing to do business with Moscow. This has only served to encourage the Kremlin. The Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet years were followed by the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea. The current war is the latest milestone in this grim sequence but it will not be the last. Resurgent Russian imperialism now clearly poses the biggest single challenge to global security. Countering this threat must be the international community’s top priority.

#### Additional ev: Russia will move to reclaim other former Soviet states

**Rukhadze 22** [Vasili Rukhadze (Visiting Lecturer of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, specializing in post-communist and post-Soviet politics and international relations), 2-24-2022, "What Happens if Russia Wins or Loses in Ukraine?," Defense Post, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/03/24/russia-wins-loses-ukraine/>] // st

Future of Former Soviet Republic¶ Furthermore, the more complete the Russian victory, the more it will enable Putin afterward to impose direct control over all other former Soviet republics (except for the NATO member Baltic countries), turn them into client states, and reinstate some reshaped version of the Soviet empire, with Russia as its core.¶ It’s highly unlikely that there will be much, if any, resistance from the West to impede this process after Moscow’s supposed victory in Ukraine.¶ In general, the successful conquest of Ukraine can establish Russia and its newly acquired satellites as a separate, distinctly anti-Western power block with a radically conservative ideology, something Putin has actively been championing since 2012.¶ Hence, the mid-term and even the long-term future of former Soviet republics depends not only on a possible Russian victory in Ukraine but also on how decisive that victory will be.

#### Additional ev: Putin and the people of Russia want to restore Soviet Union territories

**Chaisty 4/13** [Paul Chaisty (A Professor of Russian and East European Politics, University of Oxford), 4-13-2022, "Putin's Russia: people increasingly identify with the Soviet Union – here's what that means," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/putins-russia-people-increasingly-identify-with-the-soviet-union-heres-what-that-means-181129>] // st

The view that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, wants to restore territories of the Soviet Union has been a big part of the commentary on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But how much is he in tune with the wishes of the Russian people? Our research suggests that while Russian citizens increasingly identify with the USSR, this is only partially explained by their desire to expand Russia’s borders. People’s identification with the Soviet Union appears to have a clear and growing basis in Russian public opinion. Surveys we have conducted throughout the Putin period show that Soviet identification among the general population – something that had been steadily declining after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 – began to increase in 2014, when the Russian government annexed Crimea and supported rebellions in the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. By 2021, almost 50% of those surveyed identified with the Soviet Union rather than the Russian Federation.¶ [graph omitted]¶ This pattern was also evident among Putin’s supporters. As the graph below shows, after we have controlled for age and affluence – two variables that are strong predictors of identifying with the Soviet Union, with older and less affluent people more inclined to identify with the USSR – the probability that Putin voters are likely to be Soviet rather than Russian identifiers increases significantly after 2014.¶ [graph omitted]¶ But is this growth in Soviet identity motivated by support for Putin’s expansionist policies? In other words, did the annexation of Crimea create a bedrock of expansionist support for the Kremlin’s military assault on Ukraine in 2022?¶ Hankering for the past¶ Identification with the Soviet past can derive from many sources. These tend to include nostalgia for Soviet era economic and welfare policies as well as a cultural nostalgia for a particular Soviet “way of life” and traditional values. It can also manifest as a desire for direct worker participation in politics, and a rejection of “elitist” forms of representative liberal democracy. Finally – and in line with the primary focus of our research – identifying with the Soviet Union may stem from hostility towards perceived western interference and a desire to expand Russia’s borders to include parts of the former Soviet Union – the so-called “near abroad”.

### Geostrategy

#### Ukrainian defeat allows Russia to strengthen their land and air forces and grow their sphere of influence – forces will target NATO and exploit its vulnerabilities

**Midttun 20** [Hans Petter Midttun (Hans Petter Midttun is educated at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the Norwegian National Defence Command and Staff College and the Norwegian Defense College, as well as education from the Federal Defence Forces of Germany. He has broad international experience from both operations and postings abroad (NATO, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Ukraine). The service includes seven years in command of frigates and six NATO deployments. Midttun put into operation, tested and verified the operational capabilities of one of the newest frigates in the Norwegian Navy. He served at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) before being posted to Ukraine as the Norwegian Defence Attache (2014-2018). Based on previous experiences, Midttun is presently publishing articles and analytic works on the security situation in and around Ukraine as a private person.), 5-22-2020, "What if? Hybrid War and consequences for Europe (part 1)," Euromaidan Press, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/06/what-if-hybrid-war-and-consequences-for-europe-part-1/>] // st

After Russia, Ukraine is the second biggest country in Europe. It is 603.628 km2 and is nearly as big as Germany and Poland combined. A Ukrainian defeat would, therefore, have grave geostrategic consequences.¶ The border between authoritarianism and democracy will move roughly 900 km westward. The combined military power of “Great Russia” and its sphere of interest will move correspondingly.¶ The illegal annexation of Crimea has already secured Russia’s ability to project power towards the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and Europe.¶ Ukraine subjugated to Kremlin will go a long way in establishing the Black Sea as a “Russian lake.” At the same time, this will effectively reduce future threats to its sea control.¶ The Russian military has become much more capable since 2008 as a “result of substantial increases in expenditures on military programs and forces, as well as a focus on readiness, organization, fielding modernized weapons, and updating tactics and doctrine.” Russian warfighting in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria has supported the development.¶ According to RAND,¶ “Russian Ground Forces have local dominance along its European and Central Asian borders. Of great concern to Russia’s neighbors and to NATO are Russia’s enhanced capabilities to invade and hold territory in neighboring countries on short notice… Key investments in lighter and more mobile armor, ground-based missile, and long-range fire systems, and electronic war and cyber capabilities have turned the Russian military into a highly mobile unit in Europe capable of conducting “combined-arms maneuvers at the formation level” that “pose serious challenges to US or NATO units in a conventional conflict.”¶ This must be seen in the context of the change in the NATO force structure after the end of the Cold War, resulting in a reduction in its inventory of main battle tanks and artillery. Additionally, Russia has maintained its sustainability, resilience, and strategic mobility while developing supporting capabilities (e.g. ordnance, active and passive protection, UAV, EW, and more).¶ Achieving indirect control over the Ukrainian Security and Defence sector, Russia could potentially gain control of one of the biggest, most experienced, and battle-hardened Land Forces in Europe.¶ It includes the modernized and partly reformed Army, Marines, National Guard, and the Special Operating Forces. Ultimately, its combined Security and Defence sector could increase by as many as 510.000 men and women. The Armed Forces and National Guard of Ukraine alone consist of 250.000 soldiers. In real terms, the Russian gain would, however, probably be far less. More about that later.¶ The 8th, 58th, and 49th Combined Arms Army and 22nd Army Corps of the Southern Military District of the Russian Forces would not only be reinforced, but its area of responsibility would also border to Romania, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland.¶ A Ukrainian defeat would also allow Russia to redeploy its comprehensive Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities 300-900 km westwards. This includes traditional airpower, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime capabilities, offensive and defensive missile systems (such as the Iskander, Bastion, Kalibr, and S-400), offensive electronic warfare, special operations forces, and cyber capabilities.¶ The A2/AD concept is aimed at both limiting NATO’s freedom of movement while exploiting NATO vulnerabilities. In a time of conflict, the capability in place could impact NATO’s ability to deploy forces into and its ability to operate in the area. Increasing the costs associated with bringing in reinforcements to allies, it could potentially undermine the alliance’s political decision-making process.¶ It would cover Bulgaria, Romania, Slovak, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. This would to an extent both negate the NATO AirPower while ensuring Russian Land Forces freedom of maneuver.¶ The combination of a strengthened Land Force, the westward deployment of both Land Forces and A2/AD capacities, increased control of the Black Sea, permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and forces based in Syria constitutes a re-emergence of a military threat to NATOs southeastern flank. A threat that disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

### Psychological Warfare

#### A Russian victory results in psychological manipulation of the Ukrainian people – influences their elections and collective mindset. This leads to the decimation of Ukrainian civil and political rights by the new pro-Russian government

**Midttun 20** [Hans Petter Midttun (Hans Petter Midttun is educated at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the Norwegian National Defence Command and Staff College and the Norwegian Defense College, as well as education from the Federal Defence Forces of Germany. He has broad international experience from both operations and postings abroad (NATO, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Ukraine). The service includes seven years in command of frigates and six NATO deployments. Midttun put into operation, tested and verified the operational capabilities of one of the newest frigates in the Norwegian Navy. He served at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) before being posted to Ukraine as the Norwegian Defence Attache (2014-2018). Based on previous experiences, Midttun is presently publishing articles and analytic works on the security situation in and around Ukraine as a private person.), 2-18-2020, "What if? Hybrid War and consequences for Europe (part 1)," Euromaidan Press, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/06/what-if-hybrid-war-and-consequences-for-europe-part-1/>] // st

Consequently, the main threat is not military invasion and occupation, but the accumulated psychological effect on both population and leadership as a result of a long-term effort to destabilize Ukraine from within. The ever-present threat has, however, shaped and will continue to shape the collective mindset at all levels of the Ukrainian society. The military threat will keep on generating profound economic, political, and diplomatic insecurity in the years to come, while little by little helping create the foundation for a future Ukrainian defeat.¶ Russia wants to re-establish political control over Ukraine and thus reintegrate it into the “Russian world.” For this to happen, Ukraine’s political landscape must change.¶ Russia has won – and Ukraine and Europe have lost – when Ukraine either elects a pro-Russian government or a government who gives in to Russian pressure. This will both ensure and legitimize Russian control over Ukraine politics, and consequently, its choice of alliances. Additionally, this will remove the basis for international sanctions and create the basis for normalization between Russia and the West.¶ The outcome of a Hybrid War is a victory in the cognitive space. Russia will have succeeded in influencing the Ukrainian majority to elect what is, from a Russian perspective, the ideal president and government.¶ Presently, it is, of course, close to impossible to imagine Ukraine electing a pro-Russian president and government, and equally difficult to envisage Ukraine accepting a government crossing the red line. Any process of changing the country’s pro-European and Euro-Atlantic path would, however, be as gradual and long-term as the Hybrid War itself. It would include the introduction of the mindset, public support and legal framework needed to ensure an as peaceful transition as possible.¶ The process would include the gradual preparations for what is bound to follow a political and diplomatic U-turn; namely civil protests, demonstrations and ultimately another Euromaidan.¶ This would probably include transfer of control of the National Guard to the president and several constitutional changes to increase the power of internal forces to deny and dissolve illegal gatherings, political rallies, and demonstrations; increase control over media and social networks, infringement of basic civil and political rights such as privacy and the freedom of thought, speech, religion, press, assembly, and movement, the right to a fair trial and due process, and more.¶ Any president or government giving in to Russian pressure would need to gradually copy the Russian legislation to be both able to remain in power and ensure a level of stability. Ukraine would slowly need to turn into an autocracy, where all power is gathered by a political elite under Russian influence, without any constitutional or institutional restrictions. Key leadership positions would be replaced by people who are considered loyal to a new president and government.¶

### AT: NATO beats Russia

#### Russia is willing to do whatever it takes, and they will beat NATO in a war

**The Week Staff 6/30** [The Week Staff (A weekly British newspaper that takes the very best of the British and international news and comment, and distils it into just 35 succinct editorial pages.), 6-30-2022, "Nato vs. Russia: who would win in a war?," Week UK, <https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/defence/104574/nato-vs-russia-who-would-win-in-a-war>] // st

Research published in 2019 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) found that, assuming annihilation in a nuclear conflict was avoided, British forces would be “comprehensively outgunned” in a conflict with Russia in eastern Europe.¶ The RUSI found that the British Army and its Nato allies had a “critical shortage” of artillery and ammunition that would leave them struggling to maintain a credible defence position if Russia were to opt for all-out aggression.¶ “At present, there is a risk that the UK – unable to credibly fight – can be dominated lower down the escalation ladder by powers threatening escalation,” said RUSI’s report.¶ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) head Professor Michael Clarke told Sky News last week that current British and Nato rocket launch systems were developed enough for combat, but that the allies would “need much more” to hold off Russian forces with a long-range attack. ¶ But the UK wouldn’t need to stand alone against Russia. And Nato’s biggest player, the US, has an overwhelming advantage over Russia in conventional forces.¶ However, Russian military analyst Felgenhauer told Deutsche Welle that open warfare often comes down to far more than the inventories that each side of the conflict can call upon. ¶ “It’s like predicting the result of a soccer match: yes, basically, Brazil should beat America in soccer, but I have seen Americans beat Brazil in South Africa, at the Confederations Cup,” said Felgenhauer. “You never know the result until the game is played.”¶ Retired Air Vice Marshal Sean Bell told Sky News that another consideration was that Russia is not fighting by international rules of war. The Kremlin will do whatever it takes to win, without being bogged down by politics or the media, he argued.¶ “They're not constantly looking over their shoulders about, 'Oh, if we hit a civilian, if we hit a building…'” said Bell. “They just get on with it.”